Heritage Capital v. Christie\u27s by Northern District of Texas
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
HERITAGE CAPITAL     §
CORPORATION, et al.   §
  §
Plaintiffs,   §
  §  
VS.   §      Civil Action No. 3:16-CV-3404-D
  §
CHRISTIE’S, INC., et al.,   §  
  §
Defendants.   §
MEMORANDUM OPINION
           AND ORDER           
In this action asserting claims related to an alleged misappropriation of copyrighted
material from www.HA.com (“HA.com”), defendants Christie’s, Inc. and Collectrium, Inc.
(“Collectrium”) (collectively, “Christie’s,” unless otherwise indicated) move to dismiss and
compel arbitration.  Plaintiffs Heritage Capital Corporation, Heritage Auctioneers &
Galleries, Inc., Heritage Numismatic Auctioneers, Inc., Heritage Auctions, Inc., Heritage
Vintage Sports Auctions, Inc., Currency Auctions of America, Inc., and Heritage
Collectibles, Inc. (collectively, “Heritage”) oppose the motion and move for a preliminary
injunction.  Concluding that all of Heritage’s claims are arbitrable under the HA.com
Website Use Agreement, the court grants Christie’s’ motion to dismiss and compel
arbitration, denies Heritage’s motion for a preliminary injunction as moot, as dismisses this
action with prejudice by judgment filed today.
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IHeritage operates HA.com, which hosts sales and auctions of collectibles.  Images of
the items and detailed descriptions accompany each sale or auction listing, each of which is
copyrighted.  Heritage maintains previously sold listings on the website, and, as of the filing
of its complaint, HA.com hosted more than 8 million original images related to its listings.
Those who visit and use HA.com for any reason assent to the Website Use Agreement, which
prescribes rules and regulations for use and contains an arbitration clause that governs
potential disputes.
Heritage alleges that Christie’s downloaded some or all of HA.com’s listings using
an advanced computer code.  Heritage traced this activity to Christie’s, and it discovered that
some of the listings downloaded from HA.com appeared on the Collectrium website.1 
Heritage estimates that approximately 2.7 million of the approximately 11 million listings
on the Collectrium website came from HA.com.
Christie’s does not deny that Collectrium posted Heritage listing images and
descriptions on its website.  Instead, Christie’s contends that its use does not violate
Heritage’s copyright for various reasons, including fair use. 
Heritage filed the instant lawsuit alleging seven federal and state claims: copyright
infringement, under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 and 501; violation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, et seq.; violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
1Collectrium is a subsidiary of Christie’s, Inc.
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§ 1201, et seq.; harmful access by computer, under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§§ 143.001 and 143.002; trespass; unfair competition; civil conspiracy; and breach of
contract.2
Christie’s moves to dismiss and compel arbitration based on the arbitration clause in
the HA.com Website Use Agreement.  Heritage opposes the motion and moves for a
preliminary injunction enjoining Christie’s, inter alia, from posting the allegedly infringing
materials.3
II
The court first considers the motion of Christie’s to dismiss and compel arbitration of
all of Heritage’s claims.
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that written agreements to
arbitrate controversies arising out of an existing contract “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.”  9 U.S.C. § 2.  The FAA “leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a district
court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration
on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.”  Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218 (1985) (citing 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4) (emphasis in original).  When
considering a motion to compel arbitration, the court engages in a two-step process.  First,
2Not all plaintiffs join in all of the claims.
3Heritage also moves for leave to supplement its reply with a declaration, and
Christie’s moves to stay discovery.  The court denies both motions as moot.
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the court determines “whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute.”  Webb v.
Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (citation omitted).  “This
determination involves two considerations: (1) whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate
between the parties; and (2) whether the dispute in question falls within the scope of that
arbitration agreement.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Second, the court decides “‘whether legal
constraints external to the parties’ agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those claims.’”  Id.
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)).  “If there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, and there are no legal constraints that
foreclose arbitration, the court must order the parties to arbitrate their dispute.”  Celaya v.
Am. Pinnacle Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 2013 WL 4603165, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2013)
(Fitzwater, C.J.).  Because of the strong presumption in favor of arbitration, the party
opposing a motion to compel arbitration bears the burden of proving that the agreement is
invalid or that the claims are outside the scope of the agreement.  Carter v. Countrywide
Credit Indus., Inc., 362 F.3d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 2004).
III
The court first considers whether there is a valid agreement between the parties to
arbitrate.
The Website Use Agreement contains the following provision:
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Choice of Law and Venue for Dispute Resolution
By Your use of the website you agree that any claim, dispute, or
controversy in connection with Heritage and its affiliates shall:
a. if presented by a consumer, be exclusively heard by, and the
parties consent to, exclusive in personam jurisdiction in the
State District Courts of Dallas County, Texas.  THE PARTIES
EXPRESSLY WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY.
Any appeals shall be solely pursued in the appellate courts of the
State of Texas; or
b. for any claimant other than a consumer, the claim shall be
presented in confidential binding arbitration before a single
arbitrator, that the parties may agree upon, selected from the
JAMS list of Texas arbitrators. The case is not to be
administrated by JAMS; however, if the parties cannot agree on
an arbitrator, then JAMS shall appoint the arbitrator and it shall
be conducted under JAMS rules. The arbitrator’s award may be
enforced in any court of competent jurisdiction. Claims,
disputes, or controversies in connection with Heritage shall be
. . . construed in the broadest possible terms and include, but are
not limited to, any matter or transaction relating to and/or arising
out of any purchase, any offer to sell, any bid, usage of Website,
or any amendment to this Agreement, any advances, any
consigned properties, damage to any consigned, purchased or
offered properties, any interpretation of this Agreement, any
alleged verbal modification and/or any purported settlement
whether asserted in contract, tort, under Federal or State statute
or regulation or otherwise. Any party on any claim involving the
purchase or sale of numismatic or related items may elect
arbitration through binding PNG arbitration. Any claim must be
brought within one (1) year of the alleged breach, default or
misrepresentation or the claim is waived. This agreement and
any claims shall be determined and construed under Texas law.
The prevailing party (party that is awarded substantial and
material relief on its claim or defense) may be awarded its
reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.
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Ds. App. 6 (bold font omitted).4
 Heritage first contends that the parties have not agreed to arbitrate because, according
to Heritage, Christie’s maintains that it was not a user of the site that is subject to the Website
Use Agreement.5  Heritage thus asserts that Christie’s cannot take advantage of the Website
Use Agreement unless it fully embraces that it used the website to download Heritage’s
copyrighted materials. 
The court need not decide whether Heritage is correct in this respect because, even
if the court assumes that Christie’s is not a user and therefore not a party to the Website Use
Agreement, Christie’s can still compel arbitration as if it were a party.  In certain situations,
a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement can compel a signatory-plaintiff to submit to
arbitration under a theory of equitable estoppel.  See, e.g., Grigson v. Creative Artists
Agency, LLC, 210 F.3d 524, 526-27 (5th Cir. 2000).  Relevant here, “equitable estoppel
applies when the signatory to a written agreement containing an arbitration clause must rely
on the terms of the written agreement in asserting its claims against the nonsignatory.”  Id.
at 527 (emphasis omitted) (quoting MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947
(11th Cir. 1999), abrogated on other grounds by Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S.
624, 631 (2009)).  In other words, “a signatory to [an arbitration agreement ] cannot . . .
4Unless otherwise noted, citations to filings refer to those associated with the motion
to dismiss and compel arbitration of Christie’s.
5Heritage does not contend that any of the plaintiffs is not a signatory to the Website
Use Agreement.
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‘have it both ways’: it cannot, on the one hand, seek to hold the non-signatory liable pursuant
to duties imposed by the agreement, which contains an arbitration provision, but, on the other
hand, deny arbitration’s applicability because the defendant is a non-signatory.”  Id. at 528
(emphasis omitted).
The court concludes that each plaintiff relies on the Website Use Agreement in this
action.  Six of the plaintiffs’ claims are explicitly derived, at least in part, from the Website
Use Agreement: Count I (copyright infringement),6 Count II (violation of the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act),7 Count IV (harmful access by computer),8 Count V (trespass),9 and
6“Defendants intentionally and willfully entered Plaintiffs’ website using fraudulent
information and, with blatant disregard for and intent to breach the Website Use Agreement,
have infringed Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works in violation of Sections 106 and 501 of the
Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§106, 501.” Compl. ¶ 61.
7“Defendants knowingly and intentionally accessed Plaintiff’s computers without
authorization and in excess of authorization as defined by Plaintiff’s Website Use
Agreement.  Defendants were notified each time an account was suspended and intentionally
created a new account with false information rather than cease their unauthorized activity.”
Id. at ¶ 69.
8“Defendants knowingly and intentionally accessed Plaintiff’s computers without
effective consent as defined by Plaintiff’s Website Use Agreement.  Defendants were notified
each time an account was suspended and intentionally created a new account with false
information rather than cease their unauthorized activity.”  Id. at ¶ 87.
9“Defendants intentionally and willfully entered Plaintiff’s website using fraudulent
information and, with blatant disregard for and intent to breach the Website Use Agreement,
have taken control of Plaintiffs’ property, namely the content described above, and have
wrongfully exercised that control in a manner inconsistent with Plaintiffs’ ownership of the
property.”  Id. at ¶ 96.
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Count VIII (breach of contract).10  Count VI—the unfair competition claim brought by all
plaintiffs—implicitly relies on the Website Use Agreement.  In support of Count VI, Heritage
alleges:
Defendants’ intentional theft of HA.com content in order that
Defendants may offer the content and information provided by
HA.com on their competing websites is done intentionally to
steal the value and benefits that Plaintiffs realize from its
operation of HA.com and offering of original content,
information and services to HA.com users.
 Compl. ¶ 104.  This incorporates the complaint’s previous description of the alleged theft,
which is asserted in support of Count II: 
Defendants exceeded their authorization on Plaintiff’s website
by using a spider software to scrape information and/or data
from Plaintiff, and by publishing the stolen information and/or
data on Collectrium’s website.  Defendants obtained content,
information, and data of value from Plaintiff’s computers and
have realized value from their theft.
Id. at ¶ 72.  Accordingly, because each plaintiff asserts at least one claim that relies on the
Website Use Agreement, Christie’s can compel arbitration as if there were a valid agreement
between the parties.
IV
Having concluded that Christie’s may invoke the Website Use Agreement’s
10“Defendants have breached the Website Use Agreement. Among other things,
Defendants have employed spiders to copy and collect data off of HA.com.  Defendants have
used false identification to create HA.com accounts after their original HA.com accounts
were shut down for improper use.  Defendants have reproduced copyrighted information
stolen from HA.com on their own websites in violation of Plaintiff’s rights.”  Id. at ¶ 117.
- 8 -
                                                                                         
 Case 3:16-cv-03404-D   Document 41   Filed 05/01/17    Page 8 of 14   PageID 461
arbitration clause, the court must determine whether the agreement covers Heritage’s claims. 
Heritage contends that (1) the arbitration clause does not apply to claims it brings against
users,11 and (2) even if the clause does apply to such claims, some of Heritage’s claims are
outside of the scope of arbitration. 
A
The court applies federal law to decide whether the dispute in question falls within the
scope of an arbitration agreement.  See, e.g., Graves v. BP Am., Inc., 568 F.3d 221, 222-23
(5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  Under federal law, the court “resolve[s] doubts concerning the
scope of coverage of an arbitration clause in a contract in favor of arbitration.”  Neal v.
Hardee’s Food Sys., Inc., 918 F.2d 34, 37 (5th Cir. 1990).  Arbitration should not be denied
“unless it can be said with positive assurance that an arbitration clause is not susceptible of
an interpretation which would cover the dispute at issue.”  Id. (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).  “This strong presumption in favor of arbitration applies with even
greater force when the parties include a broad arbitration clause.”  Sharifi v. AAMCO
Transmissions, Inc., 2007 WL 1944371, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 28, 2007) (Fitzwater, J.)
(internal quotation marks omitted).  And the court’s inquiry “is not guided by the legal labels
attached to the plaintiffs’ claims; rather, it is guided by the factual allegations underlying
those claims.”  Harvey v. Joyce, 199 F.3d 790, 795 (5th Cir. 2000).
11Heritage appears to argue that this point affects whether an agreement to arbitrate
exists between the parties.  The court disagrees.  Heritage maintains that an entire category
of claims (those it brings against users) is excluded from the arbitration clause, which is an
argument concerning its scope.
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Because the arbitration provision at issue here applies to “any claim, dispute, or
controversy,” Ds. App. 6, it is a broad arbitration clause.  See In re Complaint of Hornbeck
Offshore (1984) Corp., 981 F.2d 752, 755 (5th Cir. 1993) (“We have held that arbitration
clauses containing the ‘any dispute’ language, such as the one presently before us, are of the
broad type.”).  The agreement’s use of “in connection with” language, Ds. App. 6, also
indicates that the clause is broad.  Pennzoil Exploration & Prod. Co. v. Ramco Energy Ltd.,
239 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that clause requiring arbitration of “[a]ny
dispute, controversy or claim arising out of or in relation to or in connection with [an
agreement]” was undoubtedly “broad” in scope).  “The Fifth Circuit has held that when
parties include a broad arbitration clause in their agreement, they ‘intend the clause to reach
all aspects of the relationship.’”  Sharifi, 2007 WL 1944371, at *3 (quoting Pennzoil, 239
F.3d at 1067).  Broad arbitration clauses “‘are not limited to claims that literally arise under
the contract, but rather embrace all disputes having a significant relationship to the contract
regardless of the label attached to the dispute.’”  Id. (quoting Pennzoil, 139 F.3d at 1067).
B
Heritage first maintains that the Website Use Agreement, which “governs Your use
of this Website,” Ds. App. 5, implicitly excludes the claims it brings.  According to Heritage,
“the purpose of the Website Use Agreement is regulation of the conduct of website users, not
Heritage.”  Ps. Br. 5.  Heritage therefore maintains that it cannot be considered “any claimant
other than a consumer,” who would trigger the arbitration clause.  Ds. App. 6.  And it posits
that a holding that the arbitration clause encompasses Heritage’s claims would subject any
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claim that it brings against a consumer to the arbitration provision, while claims brought by
consumers would be resolved in state court, a result that Heritage contends makes no sense. 
Heritage therefore concludes that the arbitration clause “covers claims that a website user
might have ‘with Heritage,’” but excludes possible claims by Heritage against users.  Ps. Br.
10. 
The court concludes that the arbitration clause encompasses claims brought by
Heritage.  The clause states that “any claim, dispute, or controversy in connection with
Heritage and its affiliates shall . . . for any claimant other than a consumer . . . be presented
in confidential binding arbitration[.]”  Ds. App. 6.  Because claims brought by Heritage are
in connection with Heritage and its affiliates, and Heritage is a claimant other than a
consumer of HA.com, the arbitration clause explicitly encompasses these claims.
Moreover, the agreement instructs the court to construe the clause “in the broadest
possible terms[.]”  Id.  As noted above, the court construes broad arbitration clauses to reach
all aspects of the relationship and all claims connected to it, necessarily including claims
where Heritage is a plaintiff.  See Sharifi, 2007 WL 1944371, at *3.  Likewise, the court will
not, as Heritage suggests, infer an exception to a broad arbitration clause.  Any exception
must be explicitly detailed in the agreement.  See Commc’n Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v.
Tyco Power Sys., Inc., 2003 WL 22271904, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 2, 2003) (Fitzwater, J.)
(noting that provision that specifically provided that certain claims shall not be subject to
arbitration created exception to otherwise broad arbitration clause).  The text contains no
such exception here, and the court therefore concludes that the arbitration clause
- 11 -
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unambiguously covers claims brought by Heritage against users.12
C
Heritage also contends that two of its claims—Count I for copyright infringement and
Count VI for unfair competition—are not arbitrable because their subject matters are outside
the scope of the agreement.13  As noted supra at § IV(A), the court must compel arbitration
as to a given claim if the clause is susceptible to any interpretation that covers the claim.  See
Neal, 918 F.2d at 37.  And this determination is made by looking to the factual allegations
underlying a claim.  See Harvey, 199 F.3d at 795.  Count I explicitly invokes the Website
Use Agreement.  See supra note 6.  And Count VI relies on factual allegations connected to
the use of HA.com.  See supra § III.  Accordingly, the court concludes that reasonable
interpretations of the arbitration agreement cover Counts I and VI, as well as Heritage’s
remaining claims, and all claims therefore fall within the scope of the arbitration agreement.
V
Heritage maintains that the court should stay the case, rather than dismiss it, as
12The court is similarly unpersuaded by Heritage’s argument that it makes no sense
for Heritage to be forced to arbitrate claims it brings against consumers but not claims
consumers bring against it.  The court cannot rewrite an unambiguous agreement.
13Heritage contends that its “only claims against Defendants regarding Defendants’
use of HA.com are those claims concerning the robotic scraping of content.”  Ps. Br. 8-9. 
Therefore, “Plaintiffs’ remaining claims, such as for unfair competition and infringement of
Plaintiffs’ copyrights, including republication of HA.com content and use of it to lure
business away from Heritage, are not arbitrable.”  Id. at 9.  Because Heritage only
specifically identifies its unfair competition and copyright infringement claims as not
arbitrable, Heritage has failed to carry its burden as to all other claims.
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Christie’s requests.14
When the court determines that all claims in a lawsuit are arbitrable, the court must
stay the suit pending arbitration.  See 9 U.S.C. § 3.  “This rule, however, was not intended
to limit dismissal of a case in the proper circumstances.  The weight of authority clearly
supports dismissal of the case when all of the issues raised in the district court must be
submitted to arbitration.”  Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 975 F.2d 1161, 1164 (5th
Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original).  When, as here, “[t]he only possible role the Court could
have would be to review the arbitration award once the proceedings are concluded[,]” the
court should dismiss rather than stay.  SGC Health Grp., Inc. v. Eclinicalworks, LLC, 2016
WL 2595109, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 4, 2016) (Lynn, C.J.).  Because the court has concluded
that all of Heritage’s claims are arbitrable, the court grants the motion to dismiss.
*     *     *
For the reasons explained, the court grants the motion to dismiss and compel
arbitration of Christie’s and denies as moot Heritage’s motion for a preliminary injunction,
Heritage’s motion for leave to supplement its reply with a declaration, and the motion of
Christie’s to stay discovery.  The court dismisses this action with prejudice by judgment filed 
14Heritage does not contend that the court should rule on Heritage’s preliminary
injunction motion even though it has granted the motion to dismiss and compel arbitration
of Christie’s.  See Ps. Br. 3-4 (noting only that the court has the power to defer a decision on
the motion to compel arbitration until after deciding the preliminary injunction motion). 
Accordingly, the court denies Heritage’s motion for a preliminary injunction as moot.
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